Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Fall 2005

Article 7

September 2005

Best Brief for Appellant: Seventeenth Annual Pace National
Environmental Law Moot Court Competition
Anthony Cotton
Marquette University School of Law

Kristin Eisenbraun
Marquette University School of Law

Randall Green
Marquette University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural
Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony Cotton, Kristin Eisenbraun, and Randall Green, Best Brief for Appellant: Seventeenth
Annual Pace National Environmental Law Moot Court Competition, 22 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 467
(2005)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

MEASURING BRIEF*
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
FRIENDS OF THE SOUTH SLOPE CUTTHROAT, INC.,
Appellant,
And
STATE OF NEW UNION,
Appellant/Appellee,
V.

CAPITOL CITY, NEW UNION,
Appellant/Appellee

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION

Brief for the Appellant,
FRIENDS OF THE SOUTH SLOPE CUTTHROAT, INC.
ATTORNEYS FOR
APPELLANT
FRIENDS OF SOUTH SLOPE
CUTTHROAT, INC.
Marquette University Law
School
Anthony Cotton
Kristin Eisenbraun
Randall Green
This brief has been reprinted in its original form.

171

468

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ...........................
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......................
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................
ARGUM ENT ..............................................
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING NEW UNION'S MOTION TO
INTERVENE BY RIGHT UNDER 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(c)(2) . ......................................
A. The CWA does not confer an unconditional
right of intervention on individual State .......
B. New Union may not intervene as a matter of
right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) as it does
not meet the standards established therein ...
1. The State of New Union lacks a protectable
interest that would justify intervention
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) ..............
2. Even if the court finds that New Union has
a protectable interest, it should not be
permitted to intervene because Capitol City
adequately represents that interest ........
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
CAPTIOL CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT ON JURISDICTIONAL
GROUNDS OVER THE NOTICE OF INTENT
TO SUE UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) ......
A. The notice of intent to sue was proper under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) because it properly
identified the FSSC as plaintiffs and
environmental groups can allege violations on
behalf of their members ........................
1. FSSC had standing to sue under Article III
of the United States Constitution because it
demonstrated that it had standing to sue
on behalf of its members ...................
2. The Plaintiffs were properly introduced in
the lawsuit because the FSSC was properly
identified, the FSSC can sue on behalf of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7

471
475
476
476
478
479
481
482

482
482

485

485

486

487

488

488

182

2005]

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY BRIEF

its members, and the notice was sufficient
to cover the purpose of the statute .........
B. The notice of intent to sue was proper under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) because it properly
identified the pollutant that caused the
violation, ......* .................................
C. The notice of intent to sue was proper under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) because it included all of
the violations alleged as ongoing ...............
D. If the court finds that the notice of intent letter
was not sufficient for purposes of the statute,
the court should dismiss without prejudice and
allow a refilling after submission of an
appropriate notice of intent letter .............
III. IT IS WITHIN CONGRESS' POWER TO
REGULATE THE POLLUTION OF THE
RAPID RIVER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION .......................
A. The four elements set forth in Lopez have been
m et. .................. . . ................
1. The introduction of 'silt' from the Torpid
Aqueduct to the Rapid River is in pursuit
of an economic endeavor ...................
2. The CWA includes a jurisdictional element
that will ensure a case-by-case inquiry ....
3. Previously relied-upon legislative history
supports the assumption that pollution of
our nation's waterways affects interstate
com merce ..................................
4. The pollution of the Rapid River from the
Torpid Aqueduct has a substantial affect on
interstate commerce .......................
B. There are no policy concerns that enforcing a
national environmental statute such as the
CWA infringes on powers that traditionally
belong to the states ............................
IV. DUE TO THE CONSTURCITON OF THE
TORPID AQUEDUCT AND THE RESULTING
DISCHART OF 'SILT' FROM THAT
AQUDUECT INTO THE RAPID RIVER,

469

490

490

491

492

492
493
493
494

495
495

497

193

470

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

CAPITOL CITY WAS AN CONTINUES TO BE
IN VIOLATION OF 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) ........
A. The transfer of 'silt-laden' water from the
Torpid River the Rapid River via the Torpid
Aqueduct constitutes a "discharge" of a
pollutant from a points source, as prohibited by
................
33 U.S.C § 1311(a) ......
B. The Rapid River is a "navigable waterway" as
defined by the CWA and construed by the
Suprem e Court .................................
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING CAPITOL CITY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS
THAT CONGRESS HAS CEDED SOLE
AUTHORITY TO ALLOCATE WATER USE TO
...........................
THE STATES..
A. Congress did not enact 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) in
order to trump other provisions of the CWA ....
B. Congress did not cede sole authority to
regulate water use allocation to the States
through the McCarran Amendment ............
CON CLUSION ............................................
APPENDIX A. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT, ORDER .......
APPENDIX B: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION,
OR D ER ...........................................
EXH IB IT A ................................................
EXH IBIT B ................................................
EXH IBIT C ................................................
EXH IB IT D ................................................

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7

497

498

499

501
502

504
505
506

508
519
521
523
525

204

20051

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY BRIEF

471

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United States Constitution:
475
U .S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 .................................
Supreme Court Decisions:
Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe of Arizona et al., 463 U.S.
545 (1983) .................................................. 504
Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976) .............................................. 504, 505
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Fed.l Power Comm'n, 324
502, 503
U .S. 515 (1945) .........................................
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1970) ........... 485
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U .S. 167 (2000) ............................................. 488
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
490, 491
et al, 484 U.S. 49 (1987) .........................
487,488
.....
(1989)
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) ...................................................... 496
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and ReclamationAss'n, 452
482
U .S. 264 (1981) .............................................
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .... 488, 489
495, 496
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) ................
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and the City of Tacoma v.
Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) ...... 503, 504
484
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) .............
488, 489
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) .............
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Unites States
Army Corps of Engineers, et al., 532 U.S. 159 (2001) ....... 500
South FloridaWater Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indi497, 499
ans, 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004) ............................
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528
(1972) ...................................................... 486
United States v. American Trucking Assn's, 310 U.S. 534
(1940) ...................................................... 484
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377
498, 499
(1940) ..................................................
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
480, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497
(1995) ..............................
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
493, 494, 495, 497
(2000) ........................................
215

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
482, 499
(1985) ..................................................
United States v. Students ChallengingRegulated Agency Pro489
cedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) ...............................
493, 494
Wickard v. Filburn,317 U.S. 111 (1942) ................
United States Courts of Appeal Decisions:
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments,
U.S.A., Inc., 1995 FED App. 0233P (6th Cir.) .............. 492
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unltd. Inc. v. City of
487, 492
New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2nd Cir. 2001) ................
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithefield, Itd.,
491, 92
844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988) .............................
486
Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185 (8th Cir. 1997) .....
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501 (3rd
485
C ir. 1976) ..................................................
Community Assoc. for the Restoration of the Env't v. Henry
491
Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) .................
Deer Park Indep. School Dist. v. Harris County Appraisal
482
Dist., 132 f.3d 1095 (5th Cir. 1998) .........................
Districtof Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (Ct. App. D.C.
50 1
1980) .......................................................
Dubois v. USDA, et al., 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996) .. 498, 499
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.
2000) ......................................... 493, 495, 496, 497
Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 1996) ............ 481
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir.
503
1982) .......................................................
North and South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate,
483
949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992) ................................
Northern Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev.
498, 499
Co., 325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) ......................
NRDC v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985 (9th Cir.
2000) ................................................... 488, 490
Public Interest Research Group v. Hercules, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d.
490
C ir. 1995) ..................................................
Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir.
499, 500
1985) ...................................................
Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.
1986) ....................................................... 48 1
Riverside IrrigationDist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th
503
C ir. 1985) ..................................................
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7

226

2005]

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY BRIEF

Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir.
1996) ....................................................... 489
Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.
1988) ............................ ...................... 491, 492
Sierra Club, et al. v. U.S. EPA, et. al., 995 F.2d 1478, 1481
485
(9th Cir. 1993) .............................................
United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir.
1982) ....................................................... 486
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317
(6th Cir. 1974) .............................................
499
United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir.
1997) ....................................... 499, 500
Unites States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536 (11th Cir. 1983) ....
499
United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 1997) ....... 481
Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351 (9th
C ir. 1995) ..................................................
488
United States District Court Decisions:
Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531 (D.C.
P a. 1985) ................................................... 491
Klickitat County v. Columbia River Gorge Comm., 770 F.
Supp. 1419 (E.D. W ash 1991) ..............................
490
United States v. Ashland Oil and Trans. Co., 364 F. Supp.
349 (W .D. Ky. 1973) ........................................ 495
United States v. Bowens, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D. Cal.
2000) ................................................... 493, 494
Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo. 1977) ....
494
Federal Rules, Statutes, and Regulations:
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1996) .............................
500, 501
40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (1973) ......................
479, 487, 490, 491
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) ......................................
passim
15 U.S.C. § 2619(c) (1977) .....
......................
483
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(3)(B) (1973) ............................
483
30 U.S.C. § 1270(c)(2) (1977) ...............................
483
33 U .S.C. § 1251 (1987) ....................................
478
33 U .S.C. § 1251(a) (1987) ..................................
501
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1977) .......... 477, 481, 501, 502, 503, 504
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1972) ...............
476, 478, 480, 487, 500
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) ................................
476, 487
491
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1996) ..................................
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1972) ....................
475, 480, 481, 499
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (1972) ..............................
498
33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1977) ..............................
501, 503
237

474
33
33
33
43

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

§ 1365 (1987) ................................
479, 503
§ 1365(b)(1)(A) (1972) ..........................
passim
§ 1365(c)(2) (1972) ............
476, 479, 482, 483, 484
§ 666(a) (1952) ..........................
481, 502, 504

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7

248

2005]

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY BRIEF

475

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §1291, federal courts of appeal have
jurisdiction over final decisions rendered by all district courts. See
28 U.S.C.A. §1291. The Supreme Court has held that section 1291
is to be given a "practical rather than a technical construction."
See Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949). Indeed, the effect of section 1291 is to disallow appeal from
any decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete. See id. at
546. In the instant matter, the District Court's decision to permit
New Union to intervene as a matter of right is appealable as it is
not interlocutory and occurs after the finality of judgment. Because the court granted summary judgment against FSSC on all
issues raised by Capitol City, the judgment was final. On appeal of
this final judgment, FSSC seeks review by the Court of Appeals as
to whether the district court erred in permitting New Union to
intervene as of right under Rule 24(a).
Whether the Rapid River is a navigable waterway under 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7) is an issue of federal statutory interpretation. In
addition, the question of whether Congress has the power to regulate the pollution of the Rapid River is an issue that requires the
interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause. U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Federal courts, including this Court and the
United States District Court for the District of New Union, are the
final expositors on question of federal law. Katz v. Children'sHospital of Orange County, 28 F.3d 1520, 1529 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994). As
federal courts, both this Court and The United States District
Court for the District of New Union have jurisdiction over these
questions.

259
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the Court below err in granting New Union's motion to
intervene by right under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2)?
2. Did the Court below err in granting Capitol City's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case because FSSC's members, Nelson
Spinner and Newton Creel, failed to give proper prior notice of
their intent to sue under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)?
3. Did the Court below err in granting Capitol City's motion for
summary judgment that Capitol City's diversion of the siltladen waters of the Torpid River to the pristine Rapid River
without a permit issued under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 did not constitute a violation of 33 U.S.C. §1311(a)?
4. Did the Court below err in granting Capitol City's motion for
summary judgment that New Union's granting of a permit for
Capitol City's diversion of the Torpid River to the Rapid River
as part of the State's control over water ownership, use and
allocation obviated application of the federal Clean Water Act
to the diversion?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union ("District Court") granting defendant, Capitol City, New Union's ("Capitol City") motion for
summary judgment. The District Court dismissed the action
brought by Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc. ("FSSC")
against Capitol City for the discharge of a pollutant into the Rapid
River without a permit issued under § 402 of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000), thus violating CWA § 301(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995). In turn, FSSC filed a complaint, under
the citizen suit provision, against Capitol City under CWA § 309,
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995). New Union is an intervenor plaintiff
to this action under CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1987).
The District Court granted summary judgment on all three
grounds that New Union argues. First, the District Court agreed
with Capitol City that FSSC failed to give proper notice pursuant
to the citizen suit provision in 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The District Court reasoned that the notice of intent to sue was insufficient under the statute and because notice is jurisdictional and
Capitol City did not receive adequate notice, the court does not
have jurisdiction over the complaint. (R. 6.) The District Court
said the notice was not sufficient because it did not properly idenhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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tify the correct plaintiffs, it failed to identify the proper pollutant,
and it did not allege continuing violations of the pollutant being
added to the Rapid River. (R. 5-7.)
Second, the District Court also granted Capitol City's summary judgment motion on the ground that FSSC did not satisfy all
of the requirements of the statute to hold Capitol City liable. (R.
7.) Specifically, the District Court found that the Rapid River is
not navigable and that the addition of pollutants occurred at the
Torpid River and not the Rapid River. (id.) The District Court held
that the Rapid River did not fall under the traditional definitions
of navigable waterways and because the Rapid River is not a tributary of the Platte River, then it cannot be held to be navigable
under a broad definition pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The
District Court also held that the pollutant was added where the
pollutant naturally occurs in the Torpid River, from non-point
source shore-side erosion. (R. at 9.)
Third, the District Court granted Capitol City's motion on the
basis that 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) removed the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to make decisions that
would "supercede, abrogate, or otherwise impair the authority of a
State to allocate water within its jurisdiction." (R. at 10.) The District Court held that the McCarran Amendment ceded sole authority to the individual states for the allocation of the water in its
jurisdiction, which was affirmed by adopting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
The District Court held that 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g), relating to the
state's authority to allocate its own water, trumps any other provision of the CWA.
FSSC challenges the District Court's ruling that New Union
should have been allowed to intervene in the action. FSSC and
New Union challenge the District Court's ruling that FSSC did
not meet the notice requirements in its notice letter. FSSC challenges the District Court's ruling that Capitol City did not add
pollutants to a navigable water from a point source. (R. 8.) FSSC
challenges the District Court finding that New Union has the ultimate control over the allocation of its water supply, even to the
extent that it trumps the CWA and its propositions. Thus, FSSC
and New Union join together on one ground and oppose each other
on three grounds. Capitol City fully supports the District Court's
ruling.

11
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
FSSC is a non-profit corporation, organized under the laws of
New Union (R. at 11.) The primary concern of FSSC is the preservation of the South Slope Cutthroat trout ("Cutthroat trout") that
live and breed in the Rapid River. (id.) The overall health of the
Cutthroat trout has diminished considerably in recent years. (R.
at 15.) Because of urban and other intrusions, the habitat of the
trout is now reduced to four river basins, including the Rapid
River basin, from roughly two dozen river basins at the beginning
of the twentieth century. (id.) Indeed, the plight of the trout is so
dire that the Director of New Union's Department of Fish and
Wildlife has called it "truly an endangered species." (id.)
On August 15, 2002 Capitol City was issued Inter-basin Diversion Permit No. 3857 from New Union's Water Engineer. (R. at
11.) For ten years prior to the issuance of this permit, Capitol City
had been constructing the Torpid Aqueduct so as to divert water
from the Torpid River to the Rapid River. (R. at 4.) Capitol City
began using the aqueduct to divert silt-laden water from the Torpid River to the Rapid River in August 2003. (R. at 11.) Shortly
after the city began introducing silt-laden water to the Rapid
River, two avid fishermen and members of FSSC became alarmed
when they noticed that the Cutthroat trout had entirely disappeared from the section of the Rapid River downstream from the
Torpid Aqueduct. (R. at 13-14.) As indicated by New Union's Director of the Department of Fish and Wildlife, the population of
the trout probably will not survive in the Rapid River below the
diversion of silt-laden water. (R. at 15.)
FSSC provided the Director of the Capitol City Water Supply
Agency, the Director of New Union's Water Pollution Control
Agency, and the Regional Administrator of the U.S. EPA, with notice of intent to sue on June 1, 2004. (R. at 11.) This notice identified FSSC as suing on behalf of its members, the pollutant that
caused the violation of the CWA, and the time frame during which
the violation and pollution occurred. (id.)
On August 1, 2004, FSSC brought suit against Capitol City
for violating 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). (R. at 3.) The lawsuit was
brought under the "citizen suit" provision of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251, 1365, alleging that Capitol City was in violation of the
CWA because its diversion of contaminated water through the
Torpid Aqueduct does not occur pursuant to an EPA issued permit. (id.) Shortly after FSSC filed its lawsuit against Capitol City,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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New Union sought intervention as a matter of right under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). (R. at 4.) New Union
averred that its intervention was on behalf of FSSC, although
both FSSC and Capitol City opposed its intervention. (R. at 4-5.)
After the intervention was granted, New Union argued for, and
supported every substantive position advanced by Capitol City for
summary judgment against FSSC. (R. at 2.) As it unfolded, the
only area of in which New Union supported FSSC was over the
jurisdictional matter of whether proper prior notice of intent to
sue was given under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the District Court's decision granting New Union's motion to intervene by right under 33 U.S.C.
§1365(c)(2). Rule 24(a) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. outlines the procedure
whereby a party may intervene as a matter of right in pending
litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Under Rule 24(a) a party may
intervene as of right if one of two circumstances applies. First, a
party may intervene if a federal statute confers an unconditional
right of intervention. Id. New Union may not intervene under this
provision as the CWA simply contains no provision conferring an
unconditional right of intervention on states. Secondly, a party
may intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) if an applicant claims an interest, the protection of which may, as a practical
matter, be impaired or impeded if the lawsuit proceeds without
the party's intervention. Id. New Union's motion to intervene
must fail under this alternative theory as it has not demonstrated
that it has a protectable interest. Moreover, even if New Union's
interest can be found to be protectable, there is no evidence that
this interest is not adequately represented by Capitol City.
FSSC's notice of intent to sue was proper under both 33
This Court
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) and 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a).
should reverse the District Court's opinion because this Court
should not allow form to prevail over substance when considering
the content of the notice of intent letter and should instead look to
the purpose of the notice of intent. The intent Congress had behind CWA's citizen suit provision was to allow ordinary citizens to
sue when there is a violation of the CWA. Environmental groups
can sue on behalf of citizens whose rights have been violated. The
notice of intent properly identified the FSSC as suing on behalf of
its members. The notice of intent also properly identified the pollutant that caused the violation as well as the time frame that the
13
29
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pollution took place. The purpose of the notice of intent under the
CWA is to provide sufficient information so that the polluter can
identify and possibly rectify the allegations of the complaint.
Once the notice of intent has succeeded in this purpose, it should
be considered valid.
This Court should reject any challenge to the constitutionality
of the CWA. The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that Congress has the power to regulate "those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce" United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995), if four elements are
proven. First, the diversion of polluted water via the Torpid
Aqueduct must be pursuant to an economic endeavor. In this case
Capitol City consumes all of the water that flows downstream of
the aqueduct's discharge point and presumably charges its residents for individual consumption. Second, the statute in question must have a jurisdictional element to ensure a case-by-case
inquiry. The definition of "navigable waters" in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7) provides the jurisdictional scope of the EPA, the Army
Corps of Engineers, and the Coast Guard to enforce the provisions
of the CWA. Third, there must be legislative history that supports
the assumption that the pollution substantially affects interstate
commerce. There is an abundance of such reports even prior to
the introduction of this element in Lopez, which strongly suggest
that these statements do not constitute stuffing of the legislative
record. Fourth, there must be a substantial affect on interstate
commerce when considered in the aggregate. The fulfillment of
this element is threefold: (1) fishing is part of a $29.2 billion wildlife-related recreational industry that involves interstate travel;
(2) many important medicines are discovered due to the studies of
plants, animals and their ecosystems; and (3) there is a potential
market in the fish of the Rapid River if the species therein are
allowed to flourish. Finally, Congress has been involved with environmental efforts since the beginning of the 20th century; therefore there is little concern of Congress regulating what has
traditionally been an area of state regulation.
This court should reverse the decision of the District Court in
light of the overall purpose of the CWA to restore and maintain
the integrity of the Nation's waters; the two elements of the CWA
in dispute have been satisfied to constitute a violation of 33 U.S.C
§ 1311(a). First, the transfer of silt-laden water to the Rapid
River via the Torpid aqueduct is a "discharge" of a pollutant from
a point source. The violation is clear when considered in the corhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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rect context, that is, but for the construction of the Torpid
Aqueduct, the silt-laden water of the Torpid River never would
have entered the waters of the clear Rapid River. In addition, the
"discharge" was made into a "navigable waterway" as broadly defined by the CWA: "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Courts have repeatedly held
that Congress intended this broad definition to reach to the outer
limits allowed by the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.
The District Court also erred when it granted Capitol City's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Congress
ceded sole authority to allocate water use to the States. The District Court places considerable emphasis on 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) to
support its contention that Congress did not intend for the CWA to
interfere with States' ability to allocate water within their jurisdictions. This emphasis is misplaced, as there is no evidence anywhere in the CWA that 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) was designed to
prevent the government from regulating water standards within
States. In addition, the District Court held that the McCarran
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a), demonstrates Congress' intention
to cede sole authority to the States to regulate water quantity allocation. The Court's reasoning is inaccurate as the McCarran
Amendment expresses no purpose other than to grant consent for
the joinder of the United States as a defendant in suits for the
adjudication of water rights of which it is the owner, or which it is
in the process of acquiring.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed by the
court de novo. Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir.
1996). Summary judgment is warranted if the record discloses
that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). Upon review, the court draws all inferences in favor
of the party opposing summary judgment. Reid v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986).
The court also applies a de novo standard when reviewing
constitutional challenges to federal statutes. United States v.
Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997). When reviewing the exercise of congressional power with respect to the Commerce
Clause, a court must determine: (1) if there is a rational basis for
finding the activity in question affects interstate commerce; and
15
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(2) if the regulatory means chosen by Congress had been reasonably adapted to meet the end permitted by the Constitution. Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981). "The burden for the challenger . .. is high." Deer Park
Indep. School Dist. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 132 F.3d
1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1998).
Finally, questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de
novo, in this case whether there has been a discharge of a pollutant into navigable waterways in violation of 33 U.S.C § 1311(a) of
the CWA. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474, U.S. 121 (1985).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING NEW
UNION'S MOTION TO INTERVENE BY RIGHT UNDER 33
U.S.C. §1365(c)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides that anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action as a matter of right:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Fed R. Civ. P. 24(a).
The District Court, in the instant matter, permitted the state of
New Union to intervene in a CWA lawsuit against Capitol City
under Fed R. Civ. P. 24(a). The District Court made only passing
reference to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) in its decision and failed to articulate whether the intervention was granted under Rule 24(a)(1) or
24(a)(2). Irrespective of the District Court's failure to articulate its
reasoning, the District Court erred in permitting intervention, as
New Union cannot satisfy either of the two subsections of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a).
A.

The CWA does not confer an unconditional right of
intervention on individual States.

In its decision, the District Court permitted New Union to intervene and noted that the CWA treats States the same as the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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United States. The District Court's review of whether or not New
Union should intervene was at best, cursory. It is unclear from the
District Court's decision whether, because it feels that the CWA
treats States and the United States the same, this automatically
confers on States the ability to intervene as a matter of right. Regardless of the arguments proferred by the District Court, neither
the language nor the case law surrounding Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)
supports the contention that a State may intervene as a matter of
right under the CWA.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) confers the right of intervention in a
citizen's lawsuit alleging violations of the CWA to the EPA Administrator, if the Administrator has not already been made a party.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2). Like other statutes designed to protect the
environment, the CWA contains a citizen suit provision authorizing private plaintiffs to sue a purported violator of the CWA. In
authorizing citizens to sue under various environmental statutes,
Congress has identified who should be permitted to intervene as a
matter of right in these cases. See, e.g,, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c) (permitting the EPA Administrator to intervene as a matter of right in
citizen suits under the Toxic Substances Control Act); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(3)(B) (granting intervention as a matter of right to the
United States Attorney General in lawsuits under the Endangered Species Act if requested by either the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce); and 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (c)(2)
(authorizing the Secretary of the Interior or the State regulating
authority to intervene as a matter of right in suits under the Surface Mining Control Act).
A party shall be permitted to intervene as a matter of right
"when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). In permitting New
Union to intervene as a matter of right in the instant matter, the
District Court concluded that the CWA treats States and the
United States as analogous and therefore "it would be anomalous
not to treat States and the United States in the same manner for
citizen suit intervention purposes." (R. 5.) To support its decision,
the District Court cites North and South Rivers Watershed Assn.
v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1992) and concludes that it may disregard the statutory language specifying the
EPA Administrator as the appropriate authority for intervention
purposes. (D. 5.) This conclusion by the District Court makes the
assumption that it was Congress' intent to permit States to intervene as a matter of right in citizen suits under the CWA but
17
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merely neglected to include this in the statutory language of 33
U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2).
In interpreting statutes, the function of the courts is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.
See United States. v. American Trucking Assn's, 310 U.S. 534, 542
(1940). As the Supreme Court noted in American Trucking, "there
is no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to
determine the purpose of the legislation" Id. at 543. Moreover, as
a basic matter of statutory interpretation, the first step a court
must take is to determine whether the language at issue has a
plain and unambiguous meaning. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). In determining whether the language is
ambiguous the courts have been instructed to consider "the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used,
and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 341. In
the instant matter, consideration of the language Congress chose
to employ demonstrates that New Union should not have been
permitted to intervene as a matter of right.
The citizen suit provision of the CWA states that in an action
under the Act "the Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as
a matter of right." See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2). Unlike other statutes which confer a right of intervention on such parties as the
Administrator of the Interior, State regulating authorities, or the
U.S. Attorney General, Congress chose to permit only the EPA Administrator to have this right under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2). As
noted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) permits a party to intervene as a
matter of right when a statute has conferred this right unconditionally. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). Undoubtedly, Congress is
capable of conferring this right on the parties it deems appropriate. In fact, in the body of the CWA itself, Congress has specifically allowed for intervention under certain circumstances by
individual citizens, as a matter of right. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(B) (permitting intervention as a matter of right by
citizens when either the EPA Administrator or State has commenced an action to require compliance with a standard limitation or order). In enacting laws permitting citizen suits Congress
decides whether it will grant a statutory right of intervention. For
example, when Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control Act,
Congress authorized both the United States Attorney General and
state regulating authorities the ability to intervene as a matter of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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right. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1977). In the instant case, the District Court erred in its application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) when
it permitted New Union to intervene. Rule 24(a)(1) requires that
intervention as a matter of right be conferred in a federal statute,
and neither the state of New Union nor the District Court have
been able to identify a single statutory provision of the CWA
granting such a right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).
B.

New Union may not intervene as a matter of right under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) as it does not meet the
standards established therein.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), New Union may intervene if
certain requirements are met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The
rule on intervention as of right requires that the applicant claim
an interest, the protection of which may as a practical matter, be
impaired or impeded if the lawsuit proceeds without that person's
intervention. See Sierra Club, et al. v. EPA, et. al., 995 F.2d 1478,
1481 (9th Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit has determined that a
person is entitled to intervene of right if three conditions are satisfied: "First, the party must have a sufficient interest in the matter
that would be affected by the disposition. Second, this interest
must be inadequately represented by the existing parties. Finally,
the application must be timely." Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 504 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
921 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has reached a similar determination and applies the above-named test along with a fourth factor;
the applicant seeking intervention must be so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. See Sierra Club, 995 F.2d
at 1481. The element of timeliness in New Union's motion to intervene is not in dispute as the motion was filed at the outset of
litigation. However, because New Union is unable to satisfy any
of the other elements of the above-named tests, it must be precluded from intervening.
1.

The State of New Union lacks a protectable interest
that would justify intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2).

While New Union may have an "interest" in the resolution of
this case, the central issue is whether that interest is "protectable." The Supreme Court, in Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517 (1970), formulated the requirement of "protectability."
19
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In Donaldson, the Court held that a person did not have a protectable interest in a company's records relating to that person's income tax payments. Id. at 542. The Court held that the interest
was not "protectable" because "the records did not belong to him,
he had no proprietary right, evidentiary privilege, constitutional
claim to suppression, or any other right to interfere with the company's disclosure to the IRS." Id.
Like the interest of the taxpayer in Donaldson,the interest of
New Union in this case is not protectable. First, the State is not
the entity engaged in the appropriation of the water. Second, the
State has no ownership right over the Torpid Aqueduct as it was
constructed and is maintained by the city. Third, New Union has
no proprietary interest in the Rapid Reservoir as this is maintained by the city and all of the water therein is consumed by the
residents of Capitol City. Finally, although the outcome of this
case could affect the State's ability to grant diversion permits,
such right is always subject to federal approval of the State program under the CWA.
2.

Even if the court finds that New Union has a
protectable interest, New Union should not be
permitted to intervene because Capitol City
adequately represents that interest.

The Supreme Court analyzed the adequacy of representation
factor under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) in Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 537 (1972). In Trbovich, the
Court stated that the adequacy of representation component of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) is satisfied "if the applicant shows that
representation of his interest may be inadequate; and the burden
of making that showing should be treated as minimal." Id. at 537.
However, courts often apply a presumption of adequate representation when the party seeking intervention has the same ultimate
goal as a current party. See, e.g.,, United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon,
696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976); See also, Chiglo v. City
of Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 1997) (proposed intervenors
failed to rebut presumption that city, as parens patriae, inadequately represents their interest).
Capitol City adequately represents New Union's substantive
interests in the lawsuit brought by FSSC. Although Capitol City
and New Union differ over the jurisdictional issue as to whether
proper prior notice of intent to sue was provided by FSSC pursuhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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ant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A), the two parties are in complete
harmony with respect to the substantive matters of this case.
Even assuming arguendo that the District Court was correct in
granting summary judgment against FSSC on the jurisdictional
issue of notice, the matter is still resolved in the State's favor as
the lawsuit is dismissed. Therefore, both Capitol City and New
Union share the same ultimate goal, dismissal of plaintiffs suit on
the following substantive grounds: 1) that Capitol City's diversion
of silt-laden waters without a permit issued under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 does not constitute a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) and 2)
that 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) of the CWA trumps all other provisions of
the CWA and therefore obviates what otherwise might be a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Because Capitol City and New Union
share a common interest in the outcome of this matter, New
Union cannot be permitted to intervene as a party under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CAPITOL
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS OVER THE NOTICE OF
INTENT TO SUE UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).

The District Court had jurisdiction over the complaint because the complaint was filed at least sixty days after giving the
defendants notice of intent to sue. Providing sixty-day notice is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining a suit in the trial court.
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26 (1989). The notice
of intent to sue was also proper because it followed the guidelines
set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) as well as 40 C.F.R.
§ 135.3(a). The Second Circuit has "refused to 'allow form to prevail over substance' in considering the content required of an [notice of intent] letter, and has looked instead to what the particular
notice may reasonably be expected to accomplish." Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unltd. Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d
481, 487 (2d Cir. 2001). The plaintiffs in this case have standing
and jurisdiction because the notice of intent to sue properly identified FSSC as plaintiffs, properly identified the pollutant that
caused the violation, and included all of the violations.
The District Court relies on Halistrom for the idea that notice
is jurisdictional, however; Hallstrom stands for the concept that
the sixty-day notice provision must be strictly complied with, and
the Court in Hallstrom does not touch on the other provisions in
the statute, nor does it state that the other provisions in the stat21
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ute must be strictly complied with. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 26, see
also Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351, 1354
(9th Cir. 1995). The District Court also relies on Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), which states that the Sierra Club
failed to allege harm to itself or any of its members. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Morton, in FSSC's notice of intent to sue, FSSC alleged that it was adversely affected by the actions of Capitol City.
In Morton, the Supreme Court recognized that environmental and
aesthetic injuries were sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact standing requirement. Id. at 734.
A.

The notice of intent to sue was proper under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A) because it properly identified FSSC as
plaintiffs and environmental groups can allege
violations on behalf of their members.
1.

FSSC had standing to sue under Article III of the
United States Constitution because it demonstrated
that it had standing to sue on behalf of its
members.

If the members of the organization could have sued on their
own behalf, then an environmental association also has the right
to sue on the member's behalf. An environmental association has
the right the bring a lawsuit on behalf of its members when (1) the
members would otherwise have had the right to bring the suit, (2)
the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose
and (3) the member's participation is not required in the claim
asserted nor the relief requested. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000). In order for
a citizen to fulfill Article III's standing requirements in a CWA
action, the:
plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely . ..
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
FSSC can show that it suffered an injury in fact. In Morton,
405 U.S. at 734, the Court held that injury in fact can be established when the environmental plaintiffs avow that they use the
affected area and will be harmed if the aesthetic and recreational
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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values on the area are lessened by the challenged activity. In fact,
the Court has stated that the injury need not be large, and an
"identifiable trifle" will suffice. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14
(1973). The Fifth Circuit has also held that when members of an
organization submit affidavits that describe the harm felt by the
addition of pollution to water, the injury-in-fact requirement is
satisfied. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Company, Inc., 73 F.3d
546, 556 (5th Cir. 1996). In the present case, two of the plaintiffs
are fisherman that regularly fish in the portion of the Rapid River
that is being polluted with silt. According to their affidavits, these
two fishermen can no longer fish in the area of the river that is
most convenient and closest to their homes. (R. 13-14.)
The injury also has to be fairly traceable. Laidlaw, 528 U.S.
at 167. There must be a connection between the injury and the
conduct that cannot be attributed to some third party. NRDC v.
Southwest Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2000), affd
242 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2001). In Southwest Marine the court held
that the plaintiffs satisfied this requirement when it was shown
that the defendant's leasehold had the pollutant in it, the defendant discharged the same pollutants, and the leasehold was devoid of life. Id. at 995. In the present case, the aqueduct built by
Capitol City is depositing silt into the portion of the river that is
used by the plaintiffs. The silt was not deposited into the river
prior to the construction of the aqueduct and should be considered
a pollutant under applicable federal law. This silt is causing the
Cutthroat trout to die off.
The third requirement for standing is that a favorable decision would redress the injuries of the plaintiffs. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
561. The Torpid Aqueduct would stop depositing silt into the river
and the fisherman could continue to fish in the downstream area
of the Rapid River if the court issued an injunction. The injunction
would stop the continuing violation and adequately address the
plaintiffs concerns of silt being deposited into the river. A
favorable decision in this case would fully redress the injuries of
the plaintiffs.
FSSC has an interest in the lawsuit because its purpose is to
preserve the Cutthroat trout for fishing purposes. The addition of
silt to the Rapid River destroys the population of Cutthroat trout
downstream from the point where addition of the silt is made. It
may also threaten the future existence of the Cutthroat trout in
the Rapid River completely. The breeding habitat of the Cutthroat
23
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trout is currently limited to the upstream portion of the Rapid
River and three nearby rivers. The purpose of FSSC is to defend
the life of the fish for the future fishing habits of the fisherman
and in filing the notice of intent; FSSC was protecting that very
important goal.
2.

The plaintiffs were properly introduced in the lawsuit
because FSSC was properly identified, FSSC can sue
on behalf of its members, and the notice was
sufficient to cover the purpose of the statute.

The court has held in past cases that a notice of intent to sue
is proper despite not having all the plaintiffs disclosed in the notice, because at least one of the plaintiffs was disclosed. See Klickitat County v. Columbia River Gorge Comm., 770 F. Supp. 1419,
1423 (E.D. Wash. 1991). In the present case, FSSC was properly
identified as a plaintiff because it is suing on behalf of its members and because FSSC is one of the potential plaintiffs.
The EPA requires that all persons giving notice include their
"specific... full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice." 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. The notice of intent to sue in
this case did include the name of FSSC's attorneys, along with the
attorney's names, address and telephone number. The people responsible for giving notice were the attorneys and it was their information that was included in the claim.
B.

The notice of intent to sue was proper under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A) because it properly identified the
pollutant that caused the violation.

Congress intended the notice of intent to serve the purpose of
providing the recipient with effective, as well as timely notice.
Public Interest Research Group v. Hercules Inc., 50 F.3d 1239,
1249 (3d Cir. 1995). The purpose of the notice of intent was to
allow the recipient a chance to rectify the violations in a timely
manner before the plaintiffs have the opportunity to file suit.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. et.
al., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). The point of the CWA's notice requirement has been held not to be to prove violations, rather to inform
the polluter about the wrong and give the polluter an opportunity
to correct the problem. Southwest Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d at 996.
As long as the notice of intent substantially satisfies the intention
of Congress, it should be considered valid.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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When the plaintiffs notice sets forth the location of the violations, the names of the people seeking compensation, and the allegations, it has been held sufficient even though it does not identify
the particular dates of the violations or the activities constituting
the violations. Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp.
1531, 1536 (D.C. Pa. 1985). The EPA regulations only require the
plaintiff to provide sufficient information so the recipient can
identify the allegations of the claim. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. The allegations of the claim include the pollutant that the plaintiff is alleging causes the harm. "The term pollutant means dredged soil,
solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge,
etc.. ." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The court has found that when the
pollutant from the same source, is of the same nature, and is easily identifiable, then that notice of intent letter can be considered
sufficient for fulfilling the purposes of the statute. Community Assoc. for the Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d 943, 953 (9th Cir. 2002).
The notice of intent letter in the present case identified the
Torpid Aqueduct as the source upon which the pollution was coming from. It also identified the pollutant as silt. Both silt and suspended and settleable solids that were described in the complaint
are easily identifiable and are also of the same type. In fact, Capitol City admits that silt, settleable solids and suspended solids are
pollutants. (R. 7.) Following the precedent set forth in Bosma,
this Court should find that the notice of intent letter in the present case was sufficient for the purposes set forth in the statute.
See Bosma, 305 F.3d at 953.
C.

The notice of intent to sue was proper under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A) because it included all of the violations
alleged as ongoing.

The CWA does not allow citizens to recover for wholly past
violations of the act. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64. The statute does
confer jurisdiction over citizen suits when the citizens have made
a good-faith allegation of the continuous or intermittent violation.
Id. Plaintiffs can prove that ongoing violations took place "either
(1) by proving violations that continue on or after the date the
complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations." Sierra Club v. Union
Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170,
25
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171-72 (4th Cir. 1988)). The court in Chesapeake stated "intermittent or sporadic violations do not cease to be ongoing until the
date when there is no real likelihood of repetition. Chesapeake, 844
F.2d at 172 (emphasis added).
The court below relied on Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 1995 FED App. 0233P
(6th Cir.) for the idea that a complaint should be dismissed for all
violations occurring after the date alleged in the complaint. Id. at
10. However, Atlantic States stands for the concept that a complaint cannot survive when past violations have been cured by the
date the action commences. Id. In this case, the violations were
not cured by the time the action commenced. FSSC brought this
case against Capitol City in an effort to "enjoin or otherwise abate
an ongoing violation", in accordance with the Supreme Court decision in Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59.
Capitol City has diverted the flow of the water from the Torpid River into the Rapid River and these actions have not stopped
nor is it likely that the diversion will stop unless the court issues
an injunction. Therefore, there is no real likelihood that this repetitious pollution will stop. The lawsuit is what will adequately address the issues of continuing violations after it has gone to trial.
D.

If the court finds that the notice of intent letter was not
sufficient for purposes of the statute, the court should
dismiss without prejudice and allow a refiling after
submission of an appropriatenotice of intent letter.

The Second Circuit has held that even when a notice of intent
letter is not sufficient for purposes of the CWA, the suit should be
dismissed without prejudice and the plaintiff allowed to refile after submitting an appropriate notice of intent letter. Catskill
Mountains, 273 F.3d at 484. If this Court finds that the notice of
intent letter in this case was not sufficient for its purposes, this
Court should dismiss without prejudice and allow FSSC to submit
an appropriate notice of intent letter.
III.

IT IS WITHIN CONGRESS' POWER TO REGULATE THE
POLLUTION OF THE RAPID RIVER IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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several States. As the Court pointed out in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995), Congress' power to regulate commerce extends not only to (1) the actual "channels of interstate
commerce[,]" id. at 558, but to (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce[,1"
id., and (3) "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce" id. at 558-59. FSSC contends that the discharge
of silt from the Torpid River into the Rapid River by means of the
Torpid Aqueduct falls under the third category in which Congress
has the power to regulate commerce: "those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce" Id.
To demonstrate that Congress' power to regulate the discharge from the Torpid Aqueduct falls within the third category,
FSSC must show that: (A) the pollution is pursuant to an economic endeavor, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611
(2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60); (B) the statute in question has a jurisdictional element so as to ensure a case-by-case
inquiry, United States v. Bowens, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562); (C) there is existence of legislative history that supports the conclusion "that the
activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce..."
Morrison, 539 U.S. at 612; and (D) there is a substantial affect on
interstate commerce in the aggregate. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
A.

The four elements set forth in Lopez have been met.
1. The introduction of silt from the Torpid Aqueduct to the
Rapid River is in pursuit of an economic endeavor.

The first factor in determining if an activity has a substantial
relation to interstate commerce is whether "the activity in question is some sort of economic endeavor." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611
(citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60). In making the determination a
court must interpret this element in broad terms. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000). In pursuing this broad interpretation the Court has held that even a wheat farmer who
retains wheat beyond a federal quota solely for his own consumption is an economic activity in that it allows him to abstain from
entering a market that he would otherwise have to enter to
purchase wheat, thus influencing price and market conditions.
Wickard v. Filburn,317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Court acknowledged
this broad interpretation while setting a limit on the reach of Congress by stating: "even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far
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reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of
a gun in a school zone does not." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
In Lopez, the Court held that a statute prohibiting the possession of a gun in a school zone would go beyond the reach of the
holding in Wickard, and require that the Court "pile inference
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a gnarl police
power of the sort retained by the states." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560,
567. Likewise, the Court in Morrison held that the gender-motivated crime statute was "not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
In the current case, the use of the water from the Rapid River
is a more direct economic activity than even Wickard could purport to be. Where the Wickard Court held that facilitation of abstaining from a national market constituted an economic activity,
it is assumed that Capitol City uses the water of the Rapid River
not only to supply many companies engaged in economic activities, but charges the residents of Capitol City directly for their
water usage, both of which are economic activities. As does any
other city in the United States, Capitol City charges its citizens a
fee for the use of running water. This direct relation should be
distinguished from an activity such as possession of a gun in a
school zone, or gender-motivated crimes which bear no relation to
economic activity absent a vast piling of inferences, which the Supreme Court has refused to do. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison,
529 U.S. 598.
2.

The CWA includes a jurisdictional element that will
ensure a case-by-case inquiry.

In large part, the striking down of both the gender-motivated
crime statute in Morrison, and the Gun Free School Zone Act in
Lopez were due to a lack of a "jurisdictional element establishing
that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. The
jurisdictional element is to "ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce."
Bowens, 108 F.Supp.2d at 1070 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
The court in Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo.
1977) pointed out that the definition of "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas" serves this
purpose of defining the scope of regulatory jurisdiction for the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard, and the EPA under
the CWA. Id.
3.

Previously relied-upon legislative history supports the
assumption that pollution of our nation's waterways
affects interstate commerce.

The third factor that the Court set forth in Lopez was whether
"legislative history contains express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce. . ." Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 562. However, to avoid the problem of legislatures trying to
bring certain statutes within the reach of the Commerce Clause,
the Court in Morrison noted that "the existence of congressional
findings is not sufficient, by itself... .Simply because Congress
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." Morrison, 529
U.S. at 614.
Stuffing of legislative history with references as to the affect
on interstate commerce in order to fulfill the third element in Lopez should not be of concern to this Court. There is an abundance
of legislative history prior to the decision in Lopez, stating that
water pollution affects interstate commerce. See e.g., United
States v. Ashland Oil and Trans. Co., 364 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D.
Ky. 1973). In 1973 the Ashland court recognized that "the legislative history of the CWA is laden with reports, references and statements supporting the widely accepted conclusion that water
pollution is a national problem severely affecting . . . interstate
commerce." Id.
4.

The pollution of the Rapid River from the Torpid
Aqueduct has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.

The final step in the Commerce Clause analysis under Lopez
is to prove that the relationship between the activity in question
and the substantial affect on interstate commerce is not attenuated. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-567. When undertaking this analysis, economic activity should be interpreted in broad terms so as
not to cripple federal power. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491. In recognizing this broad interpretation, the Lopez Court stated: "where a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under that statute is of no consequence. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558
(citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)) (emphasis omit29
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ted). The aggregate impact concept has been repeatedly adopted,
most notably in Gibbs, where the court noted that the taking of
one red wolf may not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce, but the taking of red wolves in the aggregate does. 214
F.3d at 493.
The court in Gibbs recognized three areas in which the taking
of red wolves directly affects interstate commerce, all of which are
applicable subjudice. 214 F.3d at 494. First, "red wolves are part
of a $29.2 billion national wildlife-related recreational industry
that involves tourism and interstate travel." Id. at 493. Second,
scientific research is conducted and subsequently many important
medicines are discovered due to the studies conducted on animals
and their ecosystems. Id. at 494. Finally, if a species is to flourish, there is the possibility of the creation or renewal in a related
trade or market involving interstate commerce. Id. at 495.
The pollution of the Rapid River is much like the taking of red
wolves, in that it endangers the Cutthroat trout and their ecosystem. Fishing is part of the same $29.2 billion wildlife recreational
industry as the viewing of red wolves and because there is only a
small population of Cutthroat trout left in the world they it should
be afforded protection by the CWA. Next, the Gibbs court recognized that research involving plants and animals "may have inestimable future value both for scientific knowledge as well as for
commercial development. . ." 214 F.3d at 494; therefore, steps
should be taken to protect the Cutthroat trout and their ecosystem
so as not to prevent potential scientific findings. Finally, just as
there might be a renewed trade in pelts if the red wolf is to flourish, Id. at 495, there very well could be an interstate market for
the Cutthroat trout if it is allowed to flourish. Currently there is
no trade in Cutthroat trout because most of fly-fisherman that
catch this species practice the catch and release practice so as not
to further deplete their population. (R. 14.)
Just as the Gibbs court found that the taking of red wolves
was not attenuated from an economic activity, the pollution of the
Rapid River that results in the diminution of the Cutthroat trout
population is not attenuated either; "if it is interstate commerce
that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze." 214 F.3d at 498 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964)).
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B.

There are no policy concerns that enforcing a national
environmental statute such as the CWA infringes on
powers that traditionally belong to the States.

In upholding Commerce Clause challenges, the Supreme
Court has shown a great concern so as not to blur federal jurisdiction with an area traditionally of state concern. In striking down
the gun-free school zone act in Lopez and the gender motivated
violence statute in Morrison, the Court noted that criminal violence has always been an area of state concern. Alternatively,
"[t] he federal government has been involved in a variety of conservation efforts since the beginning of [the 20th century]." Gibbs,
214 F.3d at 500. As would be the striking down of the Endangered
Species Act, the striking down of the CWA "would throw into question much federal environmental legislation. [It] would be a
portentous step, leaving many environmental harms to be dealt
with through state tort law." Id. at 502.
IV.

DUE TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TORPID
AQUEDUCT AND THE RESULTING DISCHARGE OF
SILT FROM THAT AQUEDUCT INTO THE RAPID
RIVER, CAPITOL CITY WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE
IN VIOLATION OF 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).

The purpose of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
South Florida Water Mgmt Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
124 S. Ct. 1537, 1541 (2004); 33 U.S.C. § 1251. In order to serve
that purpose, Congress has made it illegal for any person to: (1)
discharge, (2) a pollutant, (3) into navigable waters, (4) from a
point source, (5) without a valid NPDES permit. A violation of
§ 1311(a) is a strict offense; the defendant's intent or purpose is
irrelevant. Greenfield Mills v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 946 (7th Cir.
2004) (citing Kelley v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2000)).
The parties to this action stipulate that elements (2), (4), and
(5) have been satisfied. Therefore, the only elements in question
on appeal are (1) whether there was a discharge of such pollutant,
and (3) whether the Rapid River is a navigable waterway as defined by the CWA.
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The transfer of silt-laden water from the Torpid River to
the Rapid River via the Torpid Aqueduct constitutes a
discharge of a pollutant from a point source, as
prohibited by 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).

The discharge of a pollutant is defined by the CWA as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source. . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this definition to refer "to the effect of the discharge on the
receiving water; it does not require that the discharged water be
altered by man." Northern PlainsRes. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003). The court's
well-reasoned support for this interpretation is that "the goal of
the CWA is to protect receiving waters, not to police the alteration
of the discharged water." Id. However, where the water from one
single body of water merely passes through a plant or other conveyance only to be discharged in that same body of water in the
same state does not "constitute an addition of pollutants by a
plant through which they pass." United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). The scenario in Appalachian
can be distinguished from the scenario in Northern Plains,where
a 'but-for' test was used by the court in saying the pollution would
not have occurred in the receiving water but for the process in
question. 325 F.3d at 1162.
Where the addition of unaltered water is drawn from one
body of water and is discharged into a biologically different body of
water the courts have deemed that to be a discharge of a pollutant
for purposes of the CWA. See, e.g., Northern Plains, 325 F.3d
1155. In support of this view the Northern Plains court clarified
its reasoning with the following analogy:
For it would allow someone to pipe the Atlantic Ocean into the
Great Lakes and then argue that there is no liability under the
CWA because the salt water from the Atlantic Ocean was not
altered before being discharged into the fresh water of the Great
Lakes. Or water naturally laced with sulfur could be freely discharged into receiving water used for drinking water simply because the sulfur was not added to the discharged water. Such
an argument cannot sensibly be credited.
Id. at 1163.
The First Circuit also justifies a rejection of a unitary waters theory by noting that once the "water leaves the domain of nature
and is subject to private control rather than purely natural
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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processes ... it has lost its status as waters of the United States."
Dubois v. USDA, et al., 102 F.3d 1273, 1297 (1st Cir. 1996). Most
notably the Supreme Court adopted this view in Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians in 2004, when it held that due to the inclusion in the
definition of a point source of a conveyance, the pollutant need not
originate from that point source, but need only to pass through it.
124 S. Ct. at 1539.
The diversion of part of the silt-laden Torpid River through
the Torpid Aqueduct into the clear Rapid River is much akin to
the analogy made by the Northern Plains court of diverting salt
water from the Atlantic Ocean and discharging it into the fresh
water of the Great Lakes. The Torpid Aqueduct can be distinguished from the plant in Appalachian, in that, but for the construction of the Torpid Aqueduct, the silt-laden water from the
Torpid River would never be introduced to the clear water of the
Rapid River. On the other hand, the polluted water of the affected
river in Appalachian would have still been present in that same
river whether or not the plant was present for some of the water to
pass through.
B.

The Rapid River is a "navigable waterway" as defined by
the CWA and construed by the Supreme Court.

"The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). In order to serve the purpose of the CWA, Congress "chose to define the
waters covered by the Act broadly." Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S.
121, 133. "Courts have agreed that Congress intended the definition of navigable waters under the Act to reach the full extent permissible under the Constitution." United States v. Eidson, 108
F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lambert,
695 F.2d 536, 538 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). It
is well established that the definition of navigable waters "makes
it clear the term 'navigable' as used in the CWA is of limited import." Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133.
To prove a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) the plaintiff "need
not prove that the pollutant actually reached the navigable body
of water." Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342 n.7 (citing United States v.
Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1329 (6th Cir. 1974)).
The Tenth Circuit supports this view that waters of the United
States is meant to reach to the outer bounds of the Commerce
Clause. Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir.
1985). (A stream not navigable in fact, was located completely in
33
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one county, and did not provide a very significant link in the chain
of interstate commerce, but the court held at least some interstate
impact (emphasis added) is all that is necessary under the Act).
The dissent in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 180 (2001),
a 5-4 opinion, recognized the true aim of the CWA, and stated:
"[t]he CWA commands federal agencies to give due regard ... to
improvements which are necessary to conserve such waters for
the protection and propagation of fish and aquatic life and wildlife
[and] recreational purposes." (internal citations omitted).
The court in Eidson may have hinted towards the broadest
definition of waters of the United States in which the EPA defined
the term in 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) as:
(3) All other waters . .. the use, degradation or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any
such waters: (i) Which are used or could be used by interstate or
foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or (ii) From
which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or (iii) Which are or could be used for
industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce...
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s).
Additionally, "Congress is entitled to make the judgment that
conservation is potentially valuable." Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1342.
The Court held "the congressional decision to maintain abandoned
railroad track [to be] reasonable even if no future rail use for it is
currently foreseeable." Id.
In accordance with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the pollution of the Rapid River via the Torpid Aqueduct is within Congress' commerce power; therefore the pollution is a violation of 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). See, e..g. Quivera Mining Co., 765 F.2d 126, and
Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336. The Court has also recognized that federal
agencies should give 'due regard' to "improvements which are necessary to conserve such waters for the protection ... of fish and
aquatic wildlife [and] recreational purposes." SWANCC, 531 U.S.
at 180. Accordingly, in applying the CWA, 'due regard' must be
given to the Cutthroat trout and to the recreational fishermen
who target that particular species along with others that thrive in
the Rapid River.
The EPA defines waters of the United States to include waters "(i) [wihich... could be used by interstate travelers... for
recreational or other purposes; or (ii) [firom which fish... could be
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taken and sold in intestate or foreign commerce; or (iii) [w]hich
are or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce." 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s). First, the Rapid River is
used by domestic fishermen and if it is not currently, could be
used by interstate travelers for recreational fishing purposes. Second, if Cutthroat trout are allowed to thrive in the Rapid River,
they could be sold in interstate commerce. Finally, it is assumed
that the water of the Rapid River is currently and will continue to
be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce in Capitol City.
Just as "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the congressional
decision to maintain abandoned railroad track was reasonable
even if no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable," Eidson,
108 F.3d at 1342 (internal citations omitted), this Court should
hold that it is within Congress' power, through the CWA, to reach
former tributaries of which it may not currently be foreseeable if
they will again directly connect to traditionally navigable waterways in the foreseeable future.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CAPITOL
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
GROUNDS THAT CONGRESS HAS CEDED SOLE
AUTHORITY TO ALLOCATE WATER USE TO THE
STATES.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) states: "the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(g). In enacting the CWA, Congress declared as one of its
primary goals, the restoration of the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Operating with the knowledge that most water pollution occurs locally,
Congress carefully constructed a legislative scheme that imposed
major responsibility for control of water pollution on the States.
See District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 860 (Ct. App.
D.C. 1980). Despite Congress' desire to allow states to develop individual systems to handle issues of water pollution, Congress
specifically reserved for itself the authority to take legal action
against any individual who may be in violation of the CWA. See 33
U.S.C. §1364(a). In the instant matter, the District Court granted
a motion for summary judgment by Capitol City holding that Congress had already ceded sole authority to regulate issues of water
allocation to the States. The decision of the District Court should
35
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be reversed for two reasons: 1) the court placed an inordinate
amount of weight on 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) thereby causing it to view
the remainder of the CWA myopically, and 2) the court incorrectly
concluded that 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) ceded sole authority to allocate
water use and ownership to the States.
A.

Congress did not enact 33 U.S.C. §1251(g) in order to
trump other provisions of the CWA.

By its terms, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (the "Wallop Amendment")
is a statement of great generality. The language of the Wallop
Amendment indicates that Congress intended to provide some
measure of clarity as to the relationship between States and the
federal government under the CWA. First, the Amendment shows
Congressional recognition of States' authority to allocate quantities of water by stating, "the authority of each State to allocate
quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded,
abrogated or otherwise impaired." (emphasis supplied) Id. Second,
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) indicates Congressional intent as to how issues of water quality should be handled: "federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive
solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution." (emphasis
supplied) Id. Thus, the plain language of 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) refutes the District Court's conclusion that Congress intended to elevate State water ownership and use allocation over federal water
pollution concerns. (R. at 10.)
The Supreme Court was confronted with an issue similar to
that presented in the instant matter in Connecticut Light & Power
Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 515 (1945). In Connecticut Light, the Federal Power Commission asserted jurisdiction to regulate the accounting practices of the Connecticut Light
and Power Company. Id. at 517. The State of Connecticut, appearing amicus curiae, argued that the assertion of jurisdiction was an
unwarranted and illegal invasion of the power of the State to regulate its local distributing company. Id. at 518. The State's argument was premised on the assumption that the Federal Power
Act, through the inclusion of a general statement that "federal
regulation is to extend only to those matters which are not subject
to regulation by the States," removed from the government the
ability to assert jurisdiction over the Connecticut Light and Power
Company. Id. In disposing of the State's argument, the Court concluded that the general purpose statement is one of great generality and "cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7

52
36

2005]

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY BRIEF

503

even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly
expressed purpose." Id. at 527.
Applying the Court's analysis to the instant case demonstrates that Congress' general purpose statement in the CWA
should not be construed so as to nullify the clear and specific
grants of federal jurisdiction over matters of water pollution. As
noted, in order to ensure compliance with its terms, Congress permits both individual citizens as well as the Administrator of the
EPA to file suit against violators of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1364(a), 1365. Because the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) should
not be construed so as to render the language regarding States'
authority to regulate water quantities superfluous, courts must
interpret the declaration so as to help guide them in their interpretation of the federal law in question. See Connecticut Light,
324 U.S. at 527.
The plain language of the Wallop Amendment and consideration of the CWA in its entirety demonstrates that where both a
state's interest in allocating water and the federal government's
interest in protecting the environment are implicated, Congress
intended an accommodation. See Riverside IrrigationDistrict v.
Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985). In Riverside, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the Wallop Amendment "indicate[s] that
Congress did not want to interfere any more than necessary with
state water management." Id. (quoting National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The best way
for a court to reach an accommodation between the competing
goals presented in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) is through the individual
permit process, whereby the Army Corps of Engineers assesses
the needs of an applicant and grants a permit pursuant to those
needs.
In its decision granting Capitol City's motion for summary
judgment, the District Court drew a sharp distinction between
matters of water use allocation and matters of water pollution
control. (R. 10.) Although the District Court maintained that these
two issues "are obviously interrelated," the District Court
surmised that Congress "ceded sole authority to allocate water use
and ownership to the States." Id. (emphasis supplied). The District Court's emphasis on the distinction between water quantity
and water quality is misguided and was specifically rejected by
the Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and the City
of Tacoma v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, (1994). In
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PUD No. 1, the Supreme Court stated in its interpretation of the
CWA that:
water quantity is closely related to water quality; a sufficient
lowering of the water quantity in a body of water could destroy
all of its designated uses... This broad conception of pollution one which expressly evinces Congress' concern with the physical
and biological integrity of water - refutes petitioner's assertion
that the Act draws a sharp distinction between the regulation of
water quantity and water quality.
Id. at 719.
The intent of Congress in enacting the CWA was not to remove
from the federal government any ability to regulate matters of
water allocation. Indeed, as the Court noted, often times issues of
water allocation are directly related to water pollution and therefore, an accommodation is appropriate.
B.

Congress did not cede sole authority to regulate water use
allocation to the States through the McCarran
Amendment.

The McCarran Amendment expresses no purpose other than
to grant consent for the joinder of the United States as a defendant in suits for the adjudication of water rights of which it is the
owner, or which it is in the process of acquiring. 43 U.S.C.
§ 666(a). At most, it enables the state courts to exercise jurisdiction over water rights suits involving the United States, by permitting the United States to be joined as a defendant in state
proceedings. See Colorado River Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Contrary to the decision of the District Court, this permission to join the United States is scarcely a
declaration that the United States has ceded sole authority to allocate water use and ownership to the States. As the Supreme Court
held in ColoradoRiver, the McCarran Amendment waives the sovereign immunity of the United States as to comprehensive state
water rights adjudications and provides state courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights held in trust by the United
States. Id. at 1242.
The District Court's conclusion that 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) is
foreordained by the McCarran Amendment and therefore
§ 1251(g) trumps any other provision of the CWA is erroneous and
unsupported by the text of the McCarran Amendment itself, the
legislative history of that Amendment, and by the decisions of the
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United States Supreme Court. The McCarran Amendment was
designed to deal with a general problem arising out of the limitations that federal sovereign immunity placed on the ability of the
States to adjudicate water rights. See Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe of Arizona, et al., 463 U.S. 545, 564 (1983). The purpose of the McCarran Amendment is therefore, exactly the opposite of what the District Court held. Rather than ceding sole
authority of water allocation to the States, the Amendment recognizes the availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication of water rights, waives the sovereign immunity of the United
States so that the government can be joined in these proceedings,
and ensures that state courts remain a legitimate forum for resolution of these disputes. See id. at 566.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this Brief, FSSC respectfully requests this Court to reverse the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees Capitol City and the State of New
Union and remand this case for further proceedings on the merits.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
FRIENDS OF THE SOUTH SLOPE
CUTTHROAT, INC.,
and
STATE OF NEW UNION,
Appellants,

Civ. App. No. 04-137

V.

CAPITOL CITY, NEW UNION,
Appellee.
ORDER
Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc. (FSSC) brought
suit against Capitol City, New Union, under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1365.
FSSC alleged that Capitol City violated the CWA by adding silt, a
pollutant, from the turbid Torpid River to the clear Rapid River, a
navigable water, through the Torpid Aqueduct, a point source,
without a CWA permit, in violation of the basic prohibition of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The District Court granted the motion
of the State of New Union (New Union) to intervene of right under
33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2). Although such intervention is assumedly
on behalf of the Plaintiff, New Union argued both for and against
positions advanced by FSSC. Indeed, while it argued for FSSC's
right to maintain the suit, it argued for Capitol City on all other
issues. Perhaps New Union should have been realigned as intervening on behalf of the Defendant. That need not be decided in
this appeal.
Capitol City filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss
the action on three grounds. The District Court granted the motion in its entirety. FSSC appeals the granting of both New
Union's motion to intervene and Capitol City's motion for summary judgment.
Each party is instructed to brief the following questions:
1. Did the Court below err in granting New Union's motion to
intervene by right under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2)? FSSC and Capitol City appeal the Court's decision; New Union supports
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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2. Did the Court below err in granting Capitol City's motion
for summary judgment on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case because FSSC's members, Nelson Spinner
and Newton Creel, failed to give proper prior notice of their intent
to sue under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)? FSSC and New Union appeal the Court's decision; Capitol City supports it.
3. Did the Court below err in granting Capitol City's motion
for summary judgment that Capitol City's diversion of the siltladen waters of the Torpid River to the pristine Rapid River without a permit issued under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 did not constitute a
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)? FSSC appeals the Court's decision; Capitol City and New Union support it.
4. Did the Court below err in granting Capitol City's motion
for summary judgment that New Union's granting of a permit for
Capitol City's diversion of the Torpid River to the Rapid River as
part of the State's control over water ownership, use and allocation obviated application of the federal Clean Water Act to the diversion? FSSC appeals the Court's decision; Capitol City and New
Union support it.
The parties are limited in their briefs to the above issues, but
are not limited to the arguments for their positions raised in the
Court below.
For purposes of briefing and argument, legal authorities may
be cited that date until September 1, 2004. Legal authorities
dated September 1, 2004 or after may not be cited or otherwise
referred to in briefs or oral argument.
Entered, September 1, 2004
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
FRIENDS OF THE SOUTH SLOPE
CUTTHROAT, INC.,
Plaintiff,
and
STATE OF NEW UNION,
Intervenor,

Civ. No. 04-894

V.

CAPITOL CITY, NEW UNION,
Defendant.
ORDER
Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat (FSSC) gave notice to
Capitol City pursuant to the "citizens suit" provision of the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1365, of its intent to sue the
City for alleged violations of the statute. In its notice, FSSC alleged that the City's diversion of the Torpid River to the Rapid
River through the Torpid Aqueduct (a combination of tunnels and
pipes) is illegal because it occurs without a permit issued under
the Act. See Exhibit A. The statute makes it illegal to add a pollutant to navigable water without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),
1362(12). FSSC alleged in its notice that the diversion constituted
the addition of pollutants (silt in the Torpid River) to navigable
water (the Rapid River) by a point source (the Torpid Aqueduct)
without a permit from August 15, 2003 (the day the diversion began) until the date of the notice, June 1, 2004. The statute authorizes EPA or a State with an EPA approved program to issue a
permit. Since EPA has not approved New Union's program, any
permit here would have to have been issued by EPA. More than
the requisite sixty days later, FSSC, on behalf of two of its members, Nelson Spinner and Newton Creel, sued the City for violating CWA § 1311(a), by discharging suspended and settleable solids
from the Torpid Aqueduct to the Rapid River from August 15,
2003 until the filing of the suit on August 1, 2004 and continuing
thereafter.
Capitol City is the largest city in, and the capital of, the State
of New Union. Capitol City is located on the relatively dry south
slope of the Front Mountains. Almost since Capitol City's founding, it has engaged in a continuous program of water acquisition
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to supply the needs of its citizens and their businesses. Much of
the water it has acquired is from rivers on the relatively wet north
slope of the Front Mountains. The Torpid River is on the north
slope and the Rapid River is on the south slope. New Union has
an elaborate statutory structure governing the allocation and acquisition of water, including a requirement that diversions of
water from one river basin to another (a trans-basin diversion) requires a permit from the State's Water Engineer. Capitol City legally acquired the total flow of the Torpid River from its earlier
users during the course of the past sixty years. It legally constructed the Torpid Aqueduct over the past ten years. It legally
acquired a diversion permit from the Water Engineer in 2002.
The Torpid River arises on the slopes of the Front Mountains
and flows north. For its first thirty miles, the River is a mountain
stream, flowing fast and relatively clear. After its first thirty
miles, its bed becomes relatively flat, and it meanders slowly
through farm and scrubland. In this later stretch it accumulates a
considerable amount of silt from the adjacent land and becomes
relatively turbid. The City's diversion of water from the Torpid
River occurs from this part of the River.
The Rapid River arises at the tops of the Front Mountains
and flows south. Its waters flow fast and are relatively clear. The
River flows into the Rapid Reservoir, which the City built in 1938
as a water supply reservoir. The City uses all of the water in the
reservoir, effectively ending the flow of the River at the dam forming the Reservoir. The Rapid River supported a population of native South Slope Cutthroat trout from its headwaters to the
Reservoir before the diversion began. These trout require clear,
cold, fast flowing water to thrive. The Rapid River still supports a
population of the trout from its headwaters to the point where the
Aqueduct adds the waters of the Torpid River. From there to the
Reservoir, the Plaintiff alleges the trout no longer exist because of
the turbidity from the added, silt-laden waters of the Torpid
River.
Nelson Spinner and Newton Creel allege in affidavits that
they fished for South Slope Cutthroat trout from the waters of the
Rapid River to its entry into the Rapid Reservoir until shortly after August 15, 2003. See Exhibits B & C. They allege that since
that date they can no longer fish for trout downstream from the
discharge of the diversion, although they admit that they can fish
for the trout upstream from the diversion and on nearby rivers.
They allege they can no longer easily fish for South Slope Cut43
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throat Trout because the trout's habitat is now confined to the
headwaters of the Rapid River and two adjacent streams, farther
from the affiants' homes than the locations on the River they were
able to fish before the new discharge began. They support their
argument with a letter from the New Union Fish and Game Department's Director. See Exhibit D. Both admit they do not eat
the trout they catch. Since they do not eat the fish and can still
conveniently catch it, query what their injury is for standing purposes. But Defendant did not raise this issue at the District Court
level. In any event, we need not address it for we dismiss Plaintiffs suit on other grounds.
The State of New Union filed a motion to intervene in the suit
by right, under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2), arguing that it is the
equivalent of the United States for purposes of the citizen suit.
Both original parties opposed the motion. We granted the motion
in open court and explain our reasons below. Capital City filed a
motion for summary judgment arguing: Plaintiff failed to give
proper notice of their suit pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A);
Defendant's diversion does not add pollutants to navigable water
from a point source as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362; and the diversion is not governed by the Clean Water Act pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(g). Plaintiff, of course, opposed the motion in its entirety.
The State opposed the first part of the motion but supported the
second and third parts. The facts stated herein are alleged in
Plaintiffs complaint, Defendant's answer, Defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and supporting documents. They are not contested. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants both motions. The suit, accordingly, is dismissed.
The citizen suit provision of the CWA authorizes the United
States to intervene "as a matter of right." "As a matter of right" is
a reference to FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). Plaintiff and Capitol City
contend that New Union has no right to intervene under Rule
24(a) because the Clean Water Act grants that right to the United
States and New Union simply is not the United States. This appears to be a matter of first impression, for the parties cite no precedent on the question. While the observation of the original
parties may be true as a matter of mere statutory wording, courts
may freely ignore the "happenstance of statutory drafting" when it
does not reflect congressional intent. North and South Rivers Watershed Assn. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir.
1992). Here the congressional intent is clear. The statute treats
States as the equivalents of the United States. It sets forth as
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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national policy the preservation and protection of the "rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b). It authorizes States to issue permits, in the same manner as the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. In the citizen suit provision, it requires citizens to give notice both to the United States
and to States before the citizens can sue, and it forestalls citizen
enforcement if either the United States or States have commenced
enforcement actions. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) & (B). Indeed, in
some ways it gives States more power than it gives EPA. In 33
U.S.C. § 1341, for instance, it requires federal permits to incorporate applicable requirements of State law, while it does not require State permits to incorporate applicable requirement of
federal law. In a statute as long and complex as the Clean Water
Act, Congress could not be expected to be accurate in all its wording. When the statute treats States on a par with the United
States, especially in the citizen suit provision, it would be anomalous not to treat States and the United States in the same manner
for citizen suit intervention purposes. We therefore grant New
Union's motion to intervene.

I
Capitol City's first justification for summary judgment is that
FSSC failed to give prior notice of its citizen suit as required by
the statute, which establishes that notice be given "in such manner" as EPA requires by regulation. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). EPA's
regulations require that notice include:
sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated,
the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such violations, and the full
name, address and telephone number of the persons giving
notice.
40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (emphasis added).
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs's notice was fatally deficient in
several respects. First, it did not properly identify the prospective
Plaintiffs, in this case Nelson Spinner and Newton Creel, rather
than FSSC itself. Second, its notice was defective because it failed
to identify in the notice the pollutant it alleged in its complaint.
Third, its notice was deficient because it did not include all of the
violations alleged in its complaint, i.e., the violations occurring af45
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ter the date of the notice. Either of the first two justifications warrant dismissal of the entire complaint. The third warrants
dismissal of the complaint for violations occurring after the notice
was given. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in
its entirety.
Notice is jurisdictional. See Hallstrom v. Tillamock County,
493 U.S. 20 (1989). Therefore, unless Plaintiff strictly complies
with the notice provision, this Court does not have jurisdiction
over the purported lawsuit. It is well established that an environmental organization does not have standing to sue on its own account, but only as a representative of its members who do have
standing. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Nelson
Spinner and Newton Creel, therefore, are the real Plaintiffs here.
Because they did not give notice and were not identified in the
notice, they cannot maintain suit now. A notice given by some
plaintiffs does not suffice to allow other plaintiffs to maintain suit.
New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Clean Water v. Espanola
Mercantile Co., 72 F.3d 830 (10th Cir. 1995); Washington Trout v.
McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1995). Neither the notice, the complaint, nor any other filing alleged any facts to justify
FSSC's standing on its own to sue. EPA's regulation requires that
all persons giving notice include in the notice their "specific ...
full name, address and telephone number." 40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (emphasis added). Since FSSC was not suing on its own behalf, but
on behalf of Spinner and Creel, they are the real parties at interest and their suit fails because they did not give proper notice of
their identity.
FSSC's notice alleged additions of silt to the Rapid River. Its
complaint did not reiterate this allegation, but alleged additions of
suspended and settleable solids. EPA's regulations require the
notice to identify the "specific standard, limitation, . . ." violated.
40 CFR § 135.3 (emphasis added). EPA's standards are replete
with limitations on discharges of suspended and settleable solids.
E.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-411. Its standards are not replete with limitations on discharges of silt. Because FSSC did not identify with
specificity the pollutant it would sue on, its notice did not comply
with EPA's regulations and its suit must therefore be dismissed in
its entirety.
FSSC's notice alleged violations occurring up to the date of
the notice, June 1, 2004. The notice did not allege any violations
after that date. EPA's regulations require the notice to identify
the "specific ... date or dates" of the violations alleged. 40 C.F.R.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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§ 135.3 (emphasis added). FSSC's complaint included allegations
of violations up to and after the date the complaint was filed, August 15, 2004. Because the notice alleged no violations after June
1, the complaint is dismissed for all violations alleged to have occurred after that date. See Atlantic States Legal Foundation v.
United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir.
1995).
Plaintiff and New Union 1 argue all these errors are harmless
and that purely technical failures in actual and adequate notice do
not require dismissal. See NRDC v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 236
F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2000). They argue that Capitol City would have
been none the wiser if the notice had identified Spinner and Creel,
suspended and settleable solids, and continuing violations after
the date of notice. They argue the case should not be dismissed for
harmless errors in the notice or that it merely be stayed for the
requisite sixty-day period. The Court rejected the stay stratagem
in Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 26. Plaintiff mistakes the meaning of
jurisdictional requirements. Notices that fail to contain the information required by EPA's regulations are defective. Washington
Trout v. Scab Rock Feeders, 823 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Wash. 1993);
Bettis v. Town of Ontario,800 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). Unless Plaintiff meets all jurisdictional requirements established by
the statute, this Court simply has no jurisdiction to hear their
case. Moreover, the errors here are not harmless. If the notice
had identified the actual plaintiffs, the actual pollutants, and the
actual dates of alleged violations, Capitol City, New Union and
EPA could have accurately determined the seriousness of the case
and would have had sixty days to take steps to avoid the suit. If
Capital City thought the notice had merit, it might have avoided
suit either by coming into compliance or by negotiating a settlement with FSSC. If it thought the notice had no merit, it might
have avoided suit by demonstrating its lack of merit to FSSC. If
either of the governments thought the suit had merit, they could
have avoided suit by taking their own enforcement action. Instead, Capitol City has had to spend considerable public funds defending a baseless suit that might have been avoided had proper
notice been given.

1. New Union might have been expected to argue for the motion. When asked
the reason for its posture at oral argument, it responded that it occasionally used
citizen suit provisions to sue federally owned facilities for violations and therefore
favored liberal interpretations of the section's procedural requirements.
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II
Capitol City's second justification for summary judgment is
that the City did not violate 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). That prohibition
is against the "discharge of any pollutant" without a permit or in
violation of the limitations in a permit. "Discharge of a pollutant"
is defined as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Thus there are four
elements to the offense: 1) any addition 2) of any pollutant 3) to
navigable water 4) from any point source. Id. Defendant admits
that the Torpid Aqueduct, composed of pipes and tunnels, is a
point source. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). It also admits that silt,
suspended solids, and settleable solids are pollutants. See 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6). It contends, however, that the Rapid River is
not navigable water and that the addition of pollutants to the
Rapid River is not from a point source.
Defendant advances two arguments that the Defendant did
not add pollutants to navigable water from a point source. First,
the Rapid River is not navigable. Second, all navigable waters are
one and addition of the pollutants to navigable water occurred at
the Torpid River, not the Rapid River.
First, Defendant argues the Rapid River is not navigable
under either the traditional definition of navigability or under
EPA's definition of navigability. Under state law, Defendant has
appropriated every drop of water in the Rapid River and has the
exclusive right to use it. Plaintiff does not contest this. Defendant
also owns the banks on the side of the river and the land beneath
it. Plaintiff does not contest this. If the River was navigable in
fact, therefore, Defendant controls whether anyone can navigate
it. But the Rapid River is not navigable in fact; it has never been
used for navigation and is too choked with rapids and waterfalls
ever to be so used. Plaintiff does not contest this. Defendant argues that under these circumstances the Rapid River does not
come close to meeting the traditional definition of "navigable
water," water which in its ordinary condition forms a continuous
highway or part of a continuous highway for interstate or foreign
commerce, The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870), or water that
could be made navigable with reasonable improvements, United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
Plaintiff does not contend that the Rapid River meets the
traditional definition of navigable water. Instead, it notes that
Congress defined navigable waters for purposes of the Clean
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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Water Act to be "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7). This congressional use of an expansive definition,
Plaintiff argues, means that Congress intended to reach more
than just traditionally defined navigable waters. Plaintiff also
points to legislative history indicating congressional intent that
navigable waters be interpreted to extend to the outer limits of
Congress' interstate commerce jurisdiction. House Consideration
of the Conference Committee, Oct. 4, 1972, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 251 (statement of Rep.
Dingell). Against this background of congressional intent for a
broad reading of "navigable waters," Plaintiff contends that the
River meets EPA's definition of navigability in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2,
because the definition includes tributaries of navigable water and
the Rapid is a tributary of the Platte River, which Defendant concedes is navigable.
Defendant responds that the Rapid is not a tributary of the
Platte River, has not been a tributary of the Platte for seventy
years and will not be a tributary of the Platte River as long as
Capital City exists. Plaintiff responds that the Rapid River nevertheless is an intermittent tributary to the Platte River and intermittent streams tributary to navigable waters are themselves
navigable. See Quivera Mining Company v. United States Environmental ProtectionAgency, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985). Defendant counters that the Rapid River is a former tributary of the
Platte River, not a present one, intermittent or otherwise, and
that Quivera and its ilk concern tributary waters that flow to navigable waters annually, not waters that ceased to be tributaries
seventy years ago and will not be tributary waters again for the
foreseeable future. Defendant also reminds us that the Supreme
Court recently pointed out that Congress' use of "navigable waters" as a jurisdictional element of the Clean Water Act had to
have some relation to navigation, or Congress would not have
used the term. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 172
(2001). Defendant argues that while EPA's definition includes
tributaries of navigable waters, it does not specifically mention intermittent tributaries and it nowhere specifically mentions any
water that was a tributary only long ago and that will not be a
tributary again. The Court agrees with Defendant that EPA's definition does not specifically cover the Rapid River and can be
made to do so only with a significant stretch.
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Indeed, Defendant argues that Congress could not regulate
pollution of the Rapid River under the congressional power over
interstate commerce. U.S. Const. art I, § 18, cl. 3. Defendant buttresses its position with the Court's recent decisions curtailing
Congress' authority to regulate matters that have no real relation
to or affect on interstate commerce. Jones v. U.S., 529 U.S. 848
(2000); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and U.S. v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Luckily, this Court need not navigate the turbulent waters of
whether the Rapid River is within Congress' interstate commerce
jurisdiction, for it does not clearly come within EPA's own definition of what waters are within the jurisdiction of its permit program. As the Supreme Court held in SWANCC, courts should not
interpret agency regulations broadly when to do so would take
them to the "outer limits" of Congress' interstate commerce authority. Since EPA's definition does not clearly include such waters within its definition of navigable waters, we must hold that it
is not, thereby avoiding the constitutional issue.
Defendant's alternative argument is equally persuasive.
Briefly, it argues that the addition of silt to navigable waters does
not occur when water flows from the Torpid Aqueduct point source
to the Rapid River, but occurs when silt naturally enters the Torpid River from non-point source shore-side erosion. In other
words, Defendant argues that the silt first enters navigable waters on the north slope, not on the south slope as alleged by the
Plaintiff. If so, there is no cause of action, because the addition is
not by Defendant and is not from a point source. This argument
assumes that all navigable waters are one, regardless of whether
they are from different river basins.
Defendant bases its argument on the "unitary theory" of navigable water recently argued by the United States as amicus before
the Supreme Court in South Florida Water Management District
v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004). The basis
of this argument is that in the statement of the basic prohibition
of the Clean Water Act, "any addition of any pollutant to navigable water from any point source" (emphasis added), the word "any"
is used before three of the four elements. It is conspicuously absent from the fourth element, navigable water. This means that
while there are many different additions, pollutants and point
sources, there is only one, unitary body of navigable water. While
this may at first appear to be another "happenstance of legislative
drafting," the wording makes scientific sense because the hydrohttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7

66
50

20051

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY BRIEF

517

logical cycle is a unitary whole, constantly connecting all navigable water. Thus, the unitary theory of navigable water interprets
the statute in accordance with its plain meaning, the preferred
interpretation, and is true to the science of hydrology upon which
water pollution control is based. Although the Court did not reach
the argument, it commented that it had considerable merit, especially in the context of trans-basin diversions in states regulating
them as part of their comprehensive systems of water allocation
and ownership. Id. at 1344-45. That, of course, is precisely the
situation in this case.
On either argument, Congress' ceding to the States control
over the ownership and allocation of water use, addressed in IV,
makes Defendant's arguments impregnable.
V
Capitol City's third argument for summary judgment is that
Congress entirely removed from EPA the authority to make decisions that would supersede, abrogate or otherwise impair the authority of a State to allocate water within its jurisdiction. See 33
U.S.C. § 1251(g). While every state has authority to regulate the
use of water within its boundaries, subject to applicable federal
servitudes, eastern, humid states, and western, arid states have
developed very different legal regimes to deal with water use.
Eastern states have developed so-called "riparian systems," allowing use of a waterbody by owners of land adjacent to it on a
"share-and share-alike basis," while western states have developed so called "allocation systems," allocating rights to use water
on a "first-come, first served" basis. See generally A. DAN
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES. New
Union, of course, is a relatively arid state with a comprehensive
water allocation system.
The regulation of water quantity (use allocation) and of water
quality (pollution control) are obviously interrelated. Some upstream water uses can degrade water by adding pollutants that
inhibit or even prevent some downstream water uses. Some upstream water uses can divert enough water from a river that it
can no longer support downstream fisheries. By the same token,
prevention of downstream water pollution and maintenance of
downstream fisheries could inhibit or even prevent some upstream water uses. While in the Clean Water Act Congress established a co-equal partnership between EPA and States for
regulating water pollution, it had already ceded sole authority to
51
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allocate water use and ownership to the States in the McCarran
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). Congress reiterated this in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(g) when it stated that "the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise impaired by" the Clean Water Act.
Congress' elevation of State water ownership and use allocation
over federal water pollution concerns in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) is
foreordained by the McCarran Act and must be honored here. Accordingly, we hold that 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) trumps any other provision of the Clean Water Act, including 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
Thus, a state's water use allocation decisions, including a transbasin diversion permit, obviate what otherwise might be a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). At the very least, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g)
makes Defendant's argument that the Rapid River is not navigable, III above, impregnable.
Plaintiffs complaint accordingly DISMISSED.
/s/
Romulus N. Remus
District Court Judge
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EXHIBIT A
By certified mail
Director, Capitol City Water Supply Agency
100 Liquid Street
Capitol City, New Union
Director, New Union Water Pollution Control Agency
150 Liquid Street
Capitol City, New Union
Regional Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region XIII
100 Federal Way
Capitol City, New Union
June 1, 2004
To whom it may concern:
This letter gives notice that Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc., a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of
New Union, intends to file suit against Capitol City for violations
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Capitol City has violated § 1311(a) each and every day from August 15, 2003 until the
date of this notice by discharging silt-laden water from the Torpid
River Aqueduct into the Rapid River in the State of New Union, at
a point on the Rapid River identified in and authorized by Interbasin Diversion Permit No. 3857 issued by the New Union Water
Engineer on August 15, 2002. Subsection 1311(a) prohibits the
addition of pollutants to navigable water from a point source without a permit issued pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Silt is a pollutant under the statute. The Rapid River is navigable water under
the statute. The aqueduct is a point source under the statute.
And Capitol City adds silt to the Rapid River from the aqueduct.
FSSC will seek an injunction against further discharges of silt to
the Rapid River except in accordance with a duly issued permit
and the assessment of penalties.
The primary concern of FSSC is the preservation of the South
Slope Cutthroat Trout that live and breed in the Rapid River.
Before Capitol City began its diversion of silt-laden water into the
Rapid River, the trout thrived from its headwaters to the Rapid
Reservoir. Now the trout can no longer survive in the silt-laden
water below the discharge from the Torpid Aqueduct and it is not
clear whether there is sufficient habitat available to it to survive
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upstream from that discharge. That could be fatal to the survival
of the trout, whose breeding habitat is now limited to the Rapid
River and three nearby rivers.
Attorneys for FSSC are June Bride and August Moon. Their
address is 89 Bleak Street, Capitol City, New Union. Their telephone number is 800-000-0000. We look forward to working with
you to save the South Slope Cutthroat Trout.
Very truly yours,
June Bride
August Moon
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EXHIBIT B
Affidavit of Nelson Spinner
I, Nelson Spinner, of 208 Heathcliff Way, Capitol City, New
Union, do hereby depose and say:
1. I am and for the last fifteen years have been an avid fly
fisherman. I fly fish one or two days every week during fly fishing
season. My favorite target fish is the South Slope Cutthroat Trout
because it is native to the waters of the area and occurs there naturally, without stocking by the Fish and Game Department.
2. To the best of my belief and knowledge, the South Slope
Cutthroat is found only in the Rapid River and the nearby Trout,
Blue, and Clear Rivers and their tributaries. I fish the Rapid
River more than the others because it is closer to my home. Until
late August 2003 I fished the Rapid River close to the Rapid Reservoir most often because that is the Cutthroat habitat closest to
my home. After late August, 2003, however, I stopped fishing that
area because the trout had disappeared, apparently because of the
introduction of silt from the Torpid Aqueduct into waters that had
been clear before. I have never seen the trout thrive in waters
that were not clear and was not surprised when they stopped living below the Aqueduct discharge.
3. Since August, 2003 I have continued to fish for the South
Slope Cutthroat in the headwaters of the Rapid River and on the
Trout, Blue, and Clear Rivers. My fishing there is as good as ever.
But I am worried that the habitat that remains available to the
Cutthroat on the Rapid is too small to support a viable population
on the Rapid River. And I worry that if their habitat is reduced to
only three rivers that they may not survive as a species.
4. To preserve the Cutthroat, all my fishing is catch and
release.
/Nelson Spinner/

State of New Union
County of Capitol
Then appeared before me this first day of August, 2004, Nelson Spinner, attesting that he signed the above affidavit under
oath and that the facts he stated therein are true and accurate.
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/Melba Toast/
Notary Public
My commission expires on 6/10/07
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EXHIBIT C
Affidavit of Newton Creel
I, Newton Creel, of 110 Franklin Place, Capitol City, New
Union, do hereby depose and say:
1. I am and for the last seven years have been an avid fly
fisherman. Since I learned to fly fish, I have fly fished in eight
states and three Canadian provinces. My favorite fishing, however, is in New Union, on the Rapid River, because it is close to
home, it is beautiful, and is home to the South Slope Cutthroat
trout, a native fish that can be caught no where else but in New
Union.
2. I fish two or three days a week during fly fishing season,
during the early morning on weekdays and into the day on the
weekends. I, and all of the other fly fishermen I know, follow the
catch and release practice so as not to deplete the small Cutthroat
fishery.
3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the South Slope
Cutthroat trout is an endangered species in all respects except the
official designation. I have not seen or heard of it except in four
river basins here in New Union, including the Rapid River. Since
Capital City began discharging silty water into the Rapid River at
the end of the Torpid Aqueduct, I have not been able to see or
catch Cutthroat down stream from the discharge. Prior to the discharge, the Cutthroat population on the Rapid River was the
greatest of those on the four rivers. It no longer is. I am worried
about the survival of the fish and am deprived of what was the
most accessible place for me to fly fish for it. My fear for the future of the Cutthroat is confirmed by the Director of the New
Union Fish and Game Department, dated August 1, 2003.
/Newton Creel/

State of New Union
County of Capitol
Then appeared before me this first day of August, 2004,
Newton Creel, and attested that he signed the above affidavit
under oath and that the facts he stated therein are true and
accurate.
/Melba Toast/
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Notary Public
My commission expires on 6/10/07
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EXHIBIT D
NEW UNION FISH AND GAME DEPARTMENT
17 Moose Street
Capitol City, New Union
Office of the Director,
Gabriel B. Home
August 1, 2003
Dear Mr. Creel:
Thank you for your recent letter raising concerns about the
future of the South Slope Cutthroat Trout, in view of the impending diversion of the silt laden flow of the Torpid River into the
Rapid River.
You are quite right that the Cutthroat is part of our priceless
heritage, the only large fish indigenous in our state, indeed, indigenous to the southern slope of the Front Mountains. As you note,
because of urban and other intrusions, its habitat is now reduced
to four river basins, including the Rapid River basin, from perhaps
two dozen river basins at the beginning of the twentieth century.
As you also note, it probably will not survive in the Rapid River
below the impending diversion of the silty water from the Torpid
River. Indeed, its habitat on the Rapid River may be sufficiently
constricted so that it may not survive at all on the Rapid River.
That is particularly disturbing because its population on the
Rapid River is greater than on any of the other three rivers in
which it is presently found. One might say the Cutthroat is a
truly endangered species, but, of course, it has not been listed as
endangered under the federal Endangered Species Act. This is an
unfortunate consequence of its habitat being precisely in the way
of the necessary water supply of Capitol City. The State of New
Union has consistently and effectively opposed any consideration
of listing the Cutthroat as an endangered species by the Department of the Interior, because its status as an endangered species
would interfere with Capitol City's use of the flows of the Rapid
and Torpid Rivers for water supply, and they will constitute
twenty five percent of that supply. To remove such a great percent of its water supply would be an intolerable economic burden
and a danger to its public health.
We here at the Department applaud your concern for the Cutthroat and the environment of our wonderful state. We must
agree with our Governor, however, that in the contest between the
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lives of people and the lives of fish, people must win. This is not a
question of a Tellico Dam, that wasn't needed to insure anyone's
survival, but it is a question of the continued availability of lifesustaining water for the inhabitants of Capital City.
Although the removal of Cutthroat habitat downstream from
the diversion imperials the Cutthroat population in the Rapid
River, we are hopeful that the Cutthroat population in the Trout,
Blue, and Clear River basins can survive and prosper. We are
mindful of the urban pressures on those basins, but they are not
presently critical to the water supply of Capitol City, so we are
optimistic about the survival of the Cutthroat.
See you on the River,
Gabriel B. Home
Director
New Union Department of Fish and Wildlife
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
CONSTITUATIONAL PROVISIONS
§ 8 CL.3: The Commerce Clause states that
Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes[.1"
U.S. CONST. ART. I,

STATUTES
15 U.S.C. § 2619. Citizens' civil actions
(c) General.
(1) In any action under this section, the Administrator, if not a
party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought
pursuant to subsection (a), may award costs of suit and
reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses if the
court determines that such an award is appropriate. Any
court, in issuing its decision in an action brought to review
such an order, may award costs of suit and reasonable fees
for attorneys if the court determines that such an award is
appropriate.
(3) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of this Act [15 USCS
§§ 2601 et seq.] or any rule or order under this Act [15
USCS §§ 2601 et seq.] or to seek any other relief.
16 U.S.C. § 1540. Penalties and enforcement
(g) Citizen suits.
(3) (A) Any suit under this subsection may be brought in the
judicial district in which the violation occurs.
(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which the
United States is not a party, the Attorney General, at
the request of the Secretary, may intervene on behalf
of the United States as a matter of right.
30 U.S.C. § 1270. Citizen Suits
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(c) Venue; intervention.
(1) Any action respecting a violation of this Act [30 USCS
§§ 1201 et seq.] or the regulations thereunder may be
brought only in the judicial district in which the surface
coal mining operation complained of is located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Secretary, or the
State regulatory authority, if not a party, may intervene as
a matter of right.

CLEAN WATER ACT
33 U.S.C. § 1251. Congressional declaration of goals and
policy
(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and biological integrity of Nation's waters; national goals for achievement of objective.
The objective of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] is to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is
hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act
[33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim
goal of water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for
recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983
(g) Authority of States over water.
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this Act [33
USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]. It is the further policy of Congress that
nothing in this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.] shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State. Federal agencies
shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1311. Effluent limitations
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with
law.
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302,
306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1312,
1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 1344], the discharge of any pollutant
by any person shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 1342. National pollutant discharge elimination
system
(a) Permits for discharge of pollutants.
(1) Except as provided in sections 318 and 404 of this Act [33
USCS §§ 1328, 1344], the Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge
of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 301(a) [33 USCS § 1311(a)], upon condition that such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable
requirements under sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, and
403 of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1343], (B) or prior to the taking of necessary implementing
actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions
as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.].
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for such permits to assure compliance with the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including conditions on data
and information collection, reporting, and such other requirements as he deems appropriate.
(3) The permit program of the Administrator under paragraph (1) of this subsection, and permits issued thereunder, shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and
requirements as apply to a State permit program and permits issued thereunder under subsection (b) of this section.
(4) All permits for discharges into the navigable waters issued
pursuant to section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899 [33
USCS § 407], shall be deemed to be permits issued under
this title [33 USCS §§ 1341 et seq.], and permits issued
under this title [33 USCS §§ 1341 et seq.] shall be deemed
to be permits issued under section 13 of the Act of March 3,
1899 [33 USCS § 407], and shall continue in force and effect for their term unless revoked, modified, or suspended
in accordance with the provisions of this Act [33 USCS
§§ 1251 et seq.].
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(5) No permit for a discharge into the navigable waters shall
be issued under section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899 [33
USCS § 4071, after the date of enactment of this title [enacted Oct. 18, 1972]. Each application for a permit under
section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899 [33 USCS § 407],
pending on the date of enactment of this Act [enacted Oct.
18, 1972], shall be deemed to be an application for a permit
under this section. The Administrator shall authorize a
State, which he determines has the capability of administering a permit program which will carry out the objective
of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.], to issue permits for
discharges into the navigable waters within the jurisdiction of such State. The Administrator may exercise the authority granted him by the preceding sentence only during
the period which begins on the date of enactment of this
Act [enacted Oct. 18, 1972] and ends either on the ninetieth day after the date of the first promulgation of guidelines required by section 304(h)(2) [304(i)(2)] of this Act [33
USCS § 1314(i)(2)], or the date of approval by the Administrator of a permit program for such State under subsection
(b) of this section whichever date first occurs, and no such
authorization to a State shall extend beyond the last day of
such period. Each such permit shall be subject to such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et
seq.]. No such permit shall issue if the Administrator objects to such issuance.
(b) State permit programs.
At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines required
by subsection (h)(2) of section 304 [304(i)(2)] of this Act [33
USCS § 1314(i)(2)], the Governor of each State desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable
waters within its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator
a full and complete description of the program it proposes to
establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact. In addition, such State shall submit a statement from the attorney general (or the attorney for those
State water pollution control agencies which have independent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in the case of
an interstate agency, that the laws of such State, or the interstate compact, as the case may be, provide adequate authority
to carry out the described program. The Administrator shall
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/7
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approve each such submitted program unless he determines
that adequate authority does not exist:
33 U.S.C. § 1362. Definitions
Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used in this Act
[33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.]:
(6) The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,
heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged
into water.
(7) The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.
(12) The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "discharge
of pollutants" each means
(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source,
-(14) The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe,
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants
are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.
(16) The term "discharge" when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of
pollutants.
33 U.S.C. § 1364. Emergency powers
(a) Emergency powers. Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.], the Administrator upon
receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination of
sources is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons
where such endangerment is to the livelihood of such persons,
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such as inability to market shellfish, may bring suit on behalf
of the United States in the appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the discharge of pollutants causing or
contributing to such pollution or to take such other action as
may be necessary.
(b) [Repealed]
33 U.S.C. § 1365. Citizen suits
(b) Notice. No action may be commenced(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice
of the alleged violation
(i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in
any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator; United States interests
protected.
(1) Any action respecting a violation by a discharge source of
an effluent standard or limitation or an order respecting
such standard or limitation may be brought under this section only in the judicial district in which such source is
located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not
a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(3) Protection of interests of United States. Whenever any action is brought under this section in a court of the United
States, the plaintiff shall serve a copy of the complaint on
the Attorney General and the Administrator. No consent
judgment shall be entered in an action in which the United
States is not a party prior to 45 days following the receipt
of a copy of the proposed consent judgment by the Attorney
General and the Administrator.
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McCARRAN AMENDMENT
43 U.S.C. § 666. Suits for adjudication of water rights
(a) Joinder of United States as defendant; costs.
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of
water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States
is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or
otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such
suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall
(1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State
laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject
to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
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